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uring the last three decades, the theory and practice of
global business regulation, loosely deﬁned as limits imposed
on the behavior of economic actors contained in rules and
standards, has proliferated substantially. Today there are a vast
number of different codes of conduct, management standards, certiﬁ-
cation schemes, reporting guidelines, eco-labels, or more general
behavioral norms operating at the global level. Regulations are
targeted toward transnational corporations (TNCs)
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 but in many
cases also inﬂuence smaller enterprises along the supply chain.
Some forms of business regulation emanate from individual ﬁrms
or business associations; others are institutionalized among a greater
number of actors, often including NGOs and public agencies. A
recent study of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) surveys 246 codes of conduct, deﬁned as
“commitments voluntarily made by the companies, associations or
other entities, which put forth standards and principles for conduct
of business activities in the marketplace” (OECD 2001: 3). Existing
codes cover a wide variety of issue areas, including labor standards,
environmental stewardship, consumer protection, and information
disclosure. A majority of codes are still issued by companies (48 percent)
and business associations (37 percent), but a substantive number
already derive from a partnership of stakeholders (13 percent).
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Attempts to regulate the activities of corporations have signiﬁcantly
changed in the context of an increasing economic integration since
1970. International regulatory approaches have been complemented
and in many cases substituted by transnational institutions. Next
to intergovernmental treaties that regulate business activities and
norms emanating from international organizations, there exist a
number of new modes of regulation that have emerged during the
last two decades. Some have already been at the center of research
such as speciﬁc forms of global public policy networks (Ruggie 2001;
Witte, Reinicke, and Benner 2000) or private interﬁrm regimes
(Cutler, Hauﬂer, and Porter 1999; Hauﬂer 2000), while others have
remained largely outside of scholarly interest. Within the larger
development of deepening and widening global business regulation,
it is the growing institutionalization of standard setting between
proﬁt and nonproﬁt actors that calls for closer attention, both in
theoretical as well as in empirical terms. The roles of business actors
and NGOs are no longer limited to shaping the traditional policy
cycle. Next to agenda setting, inﬂuencing decision-making processes,
implementing commitments, and monitoring state compliance,
private actors increasingly begin to establish, maintain, verify, and
monitor their own private regulations beyond the international arena.
Despite a ﬂourishing research agenda on corporate social responsi-
bility, business ethics, and the privatization of global regulation, the
issue of good corporate conduct remains highly contested. While global
policy partnerships, business self-regulation, and multistakeholder
approaches are widely appraised by governments, corporations,
and a number of scholars, others have warned against the “myth of
CSR” (Doane 2005). In addition, the relatively small number of
regulatory schemes and their limited implementation and compliance
often leads to an underestimation of private rules for global corpo-
rations as epiphenomenona. However, both arguments omit a
crucial dimension of global business regulation. In this article, I
contend that the most remarkable impacts of new forms of global
business regulation have not so much been achieved through their
speciﬁc rules and standards, but rather through cognitive processes
of knowledge brokering, social learning, and the diffusion and
integration of the regulatory model. Hence, an appropriate analysis
of the inﬂuence of new forms of business regulation needs to focus
on discursive changes, norm diffusion, and structural effects rather
than on compliance issues.
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This article ﬁrst provides a brief overview of existing classiﬁca-
tions of global business regulation and the newly emerging forms of
multistakeholder initiatives. Subsequently, the third section assesses
the standard uptake and implementation of private business
regulation in the forestry and environmental reporting domain. The
fourth section introduces an alternative approach toward assessing
the inﬂuence of business regulation by focusing on the cognitive
and integrative function of two well-known examples of multistake-
holder initiatives: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES). The
concluding section summarizes the ﬁndings and points to some
possible avenues of future research.
 
FORMS OF GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
 
To cope with the empirical diversity of global business regulation, a
plethora of terms has been proposed to classify the phenomenon,
such as the “voluntary codes phenomenon” (Webb 2004), “voluntary
environmental agreements” (Brink 2002), “certiﬁcation regimes”
(Hauﬂer 2003), or simply “global standards” (Nadvi and Wältring
2002). There are three different common approaches used to distin-
guish between different types of business regulation. The corre-
sponding questions are: Who makes the rules? What is the content
of the regulation? How are the commitments veriﬁed and what
compliance mechanisms exist?
In the general context of global business regulation, standards
can be discussed with reference to their level of state centrality.
Three broad categories can be distinguished: ﬁrst, traditional forms
of public regulation emanating from governments (national regula-
tion) or international treaties and intergovernmental organizations
(international regulation). The second is hybrid forms of regulation,
involving individual governments, intergovernmental organizations,
corporations, and nongovernmental organizations. The third category
is constituted by forms of business regulation that display a maxi-
mum distance from public actors. In addition, limiting our view to
forms of global business regulation that are clearly private in nature,
we can make a distinction between self-regulation and multistake-
holder approaches in the form of co-regulation. Self-regulation refers
to arrangements where individual ﬁrms or business associations
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set their own rules of behavior in the form of codes of conduct,
corporate governance guidelines, or mission statements (Richter
2001: 40). In contrast, co-regulation refers to regulatory arrangements,
wherein at least one actor is not a proﬁt-making entity and there-
fore conﬂicts of interests and conﬂicts of values have to be bridged
in order to institutionalize the cooperation and reap joint gains.
Next to distinguishing different types of code issuers along an
imaginary line of state centrality, the abstract content of the rule
can be used for a typology. Here we distinguish between product and
process standards. Traditionally, standards focused on technical
characteristics of a product such as size, composition, or function.
Originally conﬁned to the national arena, standards began to be
internationalized in the 1950s through the process of regional eco-
nomic integration. In addition, the liberalization of international
trade induced harmonization within and across economic sectors.
Different from product standards, process standards focus on the
actual management practices in the production process. Most
standards that include ethical, environmental, and social measure-
ments are process standards. However, the distinction is becoming
increasingly blurred because a range of product qualities can be
linked to corresponding production processes, for example in the
case of organic foods, where threshold levels of pesticides are linked
to production methods (Nadvi and Wältring 2002: 7).
A third possible category for classiﬁcation is veriﬁcation proce-
dures and compliance management of global business regulation. A
straightforward distinction is between ﬁrst-, second-, and independent
third-party certiﬁcation, in different terminology also known as
“reporting.” The term “certiﬁcation” in general refers to the process
of certifying compliance with the basic management or output stan-
dards agreed upon. In particular, ﬁrst-party certiﬁcation includes
forms of business regulation wherein the code issuer and the actor
monitoring and reporting on (non)compliance are identical. Second-
party certiﬁcation refers to instances of regulation where standard
making and compliance management are separated, but still rely
on information given by the regulated parties themselves. Third-party
certiﬁcation involves a clear-cut separation between rule making
and reporting compliance or noncompliance with the distinct
standards. This is realized through the involvement of independent
organizations (certiﬁers, certiﬁcation organizations) that monitor
the implementation of regulation on the spot and subsequently
 PHILIPP PATTBERG 245
 
issue a certiﬁcate of compliance, in most cases in the form of a label
recognizable to consumers. The rules and procedures specifying who
is eligible to become a certiﬁer and how the certiﬁcation process is
conducted are issued by the rule-making party. In principle, there
also exists a fourth category of certiﬁcation wherein public actors
monitor compliance with standards. However, this possibility has
so far been limited to the traditional form of global business regula-
tion through intergovernmental organizations.
In addition to classifying global business regulation according
to its source of authority, the abstract content of regulation and
the applied veriﬁcation procedures, forms of regulation can also be
analyzed with reference to their speciﬁc content, such as environ-
mental, labor, or human rights standards. What becomes apparent
is that the transformation not only includes new actor constellations,
but also a convergence of content toward issues of sustainability
rather than stand-alone economic regulation.
Next to the international regulation of business activities, there
exist numerous new institutional modes that have emerged during
the last two decades. Among those, cooperative approaches between
antagonistic actors, referred to as 
 
co-regulation
 
 or 
 
multistakeholder
approaches
 
, warrant closer attention. Novel institutional modes of
global business regulation particularly emerge at the intersection of
two broader developments in world politics. First, there is a shift from
private policy shaping to private policy making, exempliﬁed in the
growing number of industry self-regulation and standard-setting
schemes (Gibson 1999; Brink 2002; Garcia-Johnson 2001; Bartley
2003). Second, the predominantly confrontational relation between
companies and civil society has been complemented by partnership
as one possible mode of interaction. Antagonistic actors, represent-
ing the different organizational logics
 
2
 
 of business (transactions) and
nongovernmental organizations (values), engage in the development
and subsequent implementation of voluntary regulation on a global
scale (Hartman and Stafford 1997; Gerefﬁ, Garcia-Johnson, and
Sasser 2001; Arts 2002). The combination of these two trends amounts
to a new quality of governance, distancing it from mere coordination
or cooperation between private actors. Both developments are best
considered as a continuum. On a partnership axis, empirical examples
range from individual organizations that rely exclusively on their
own resources to institutionalized partnerships that incorporate a
wide range of actors within their scope. On a policy axis, empirical
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examples include lobbying international negotiations, implementing
international regulations, monitoring public commitments, as
well as setting and maintaining independent norms and standards
beyond the international arena. The following section will discuss the
inﬂuence of global business regulation with reference to empirical
examples that are located at the end of both continua: policy-making
partnerships that include both business and nonproﬁt organizations.
 
MODEST SUCCESS: STANDARD UPTAKE IN FOREST 
CERTIFICATION AND CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
REPORTING
 
Most discussion about the inﬂuence of private business regulation
focuses on standard uptake compared to a hypothetical optimum
(e.g., number of companies issuing environmental reports compared
to the overall number of companies) or actual measurement of com-
pliance (e.g., number of companies in full compliance with regulation).
With regard to these indicators, the inﬂuence of private regulation
on business actors is modest. Let us brieﬂy consider two empirical
examples, forest certiﬁcation and corporate environmental reporting.
In general terms, certiﬁcation refers to a “system by which the
conformity of products, services, etc. to an applicable standards is
determined and conﬁrmed” (Rundgren 1997: 14). While some certi-
ﬁcation programs rely on the internal veriﬁcation by the applying
organization itself, most programs in forestry prefer the more rigorous
approach of “third-party certiﬁcation,”
wherein a person or organization that is neither part of the
FMO [forest management organization, author’s note] nor one
of its customers or suppliers, is given authority to assess
compliance with the program standards. (Meidinger, Elliott,
and Oesten 2003: 7)
An early example of forest certiﬁcation, and widely recognized as the
most vigorous in terms of its actual standards, is the FSC. It was
established in 1993 out of an unusual alliance of forest managers,
environmentalists, union representatives, and large retailers.
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 The
FSC has a unique internal governing structure, securing equal
decision-making power to economic, social, and environmental
stakeholders.
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 Its regulation of business actors is contained in the
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“Principles and Criteria” that sets out detailed standards for forest
managers and enterprises along the supply chain (FSC 2000). What
then is the picture with regard to standard uptake and implementation?
In April 2006, approximately 73 million hectares of forest area
worldwide were certiﬁed in FSC terms. That amounts to roughly 1.8
percent of the total global forest cover, which stands at 3.9 billion
hectares, including commercially operated as well as protected
areas. The FSC has issued more than 5,000 certiﬁcates to forestry
companies and businesses. Conservative estimates are that 100
million cubic meters of timber from FSC-certiﬁed sources reach the
market each year, while the total supply of certiﬁed timber products
is estimated at about 234 million cubic meters on an annual basis
(Atyi and Simula 2002). However, only a small fraction of certiﬁed
timber is actually traded as a certiﬁed forest product, while the
large majority of timber reaches the market without acknowledg-
ment of its certiﬁcation status (Rametsteiner 2002: 160). The FSC’s
global share of certiﬁed area stands at approximately 30 percent in
2006, competing with two other major certiﬁcation schemes, the
industry-based Sustainable Forestry Initiative (24 percent), and
the Pan-European Forest Certiﬁcation Council (33 percent), which
represents mainly the interests of forest owners. Figure 1 shows the
increase of FSC forest management certiﬁcates (FM), chain of
custody certiﬁcates, and the total FSC-certiﬁed area.
FIGURE 1 FSC area and certiﬁcate increase, 1994–2005.
Sources: FSC (2001; 2003; 2004; 2005), FSC and WWF-Germany (2002).
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After the ﬁrst FM certiﬁcates had been issued, the area certiﬁed
according to the FSC standards quickly rose from less than 500,000
hectares in 1994 to 21 million in 2000 and then more than doubled
over the next four years to reach well over 70 million hectares in 2006.
Similar to the area increase, the important chain of custody certiﬁca-
tion, which allows products to be recognized in the market, grew from
a modest 268 in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2001, only to more than double
again to 4,500 by April 2006. Despite this general growth tendency,
FSC and forest certiﬁcation in general cover only a small fraction of
the world’s forests and is largely concentrated in the rather well-
managed and commercially operated forests of temperate zones.
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Let us now turn to the domain of corporate environmental report-
ing. Corporate environmental reporting can be deﬁned as “a tool to
communicate a company’s environmental performance.” It is used
to demonstrate “company-wide integrated environmental management
systems, corporate responsibility, and the implementation of voluntary
initiatives and codes of conduct” (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) 2005). Environmental management can be under-
stood as a process to manage the environmental aspects of a company,
plant, building, etc. This includes both rather informal and ad hoc
procedures, as well as integrated and institutionalized environmen-
tal management systems (EMS) that are independently certiﬁed, for
example according to the International Organization for Standard-
ization’s (ISO) 14,001 standard or the European Eco-management
and Audit scheme (EMAS). Although corporate environmental report-
ing and management are voluntary, some schemes may emerge as
“de facto industry standards that provide the desired legitimacy,
consistency, and comparability required by business and its stake-
holders” (Ligteringen and Zadek 2004: 1).
CERES is the earliest example of an institutionalized scheme
for corporate environmental reporting and management. It started
operating in 1989 after publishing the so-called Valdez Principles,
utilizing the huge public outrage around the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
which occurred in March 24 the same year. A group of socially
responsible investors, mainly organized into the Social Investment
Forum (SIF), and 15 large environmental groups started discussing
the possibility of using the power of investors (shareholder resolutions)
against the power of the boardroom. The idea behind CERES is to
engage companies in dialogue and work toward the subsequent
endorsement of environmental principles that establish long-term
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corporate commitment to continual progress in environmental
performance. The ten-point code of corporate environmental conduct
establishes “an environmental ethic with criteria by which investors
and others can assess the environmental performance of companies”
(CERES 2002: 31). CERES is often credited to be of major inﬂuence
for the corporate environmental management domain as a whole.
As Goel argues, “while causation is clearly difﬁcult to establish, the
CERES Principles have played an important role in improving
corporate environmental reporting over the past 15 years” (2005: 13).
But what precisely are the measurable effects of private standards
for corporate behavior? CERES’ inﬂuence on companies measured
by the standard uptake is quite modest at ﬁrst glance. After three
years of intense debates and shareholder resolutions ﬁled with major
companies, only 14 companies had endorsed the CERES Principles
in 1992, out of over 3,000 corporations originally envisaged by the
founding organizations and more than 30,000 TNCs operating at that
time. However, CERES has been able to increase the endorsement
rate over the years. In 2006, more than 60 companies are active CERES
endorsers and a number are expected to join in the near future. In
addition to business endorsing the idea behind CERES, an increas-
ing number of civil society organizations have joined CERES and
thereby increased its general acceptance. Figure 2 shows the increase
in endorsing companies and CERES coalition members.
In sum, similar to the FSC’s inﬂuence in the global forestry arena,
CERES’ inﬂuence on business actors through its concrete rules and
standards must be considered rather modest, although there seems
to be a sustained growth trend of both civil society endorsers and ﬁrms.
 
GOING BEYOND GOOD CORPORATE CONDUCT: 
COGNITIVE AND INTEGRATIVE GOVERNANCE
 
In order to arrive at a more accurate picture of the inﬂuence of
multistakeholder initiatives that aim at regulating global business
activity, we need to incorporate two additional functions that these
schemes perform: cognitive and integrative governance.
First, measurable inﬂuences of private business regulation are
achieved through a cognitive function. Regulatory systems in the area
of global sustainability politics operate within the complex environ-
ment of scientiﬁc uncertainty. The development of adequate standards
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for sustainable forestry, for example, will depend on expertise in
issue areas ranging from biodiversity conservation to the global
timber trade and consumer preferences. Brokering knowledge and
organizing effective learning processes among different stakeholders is
therefore key to inﬂuencing the behavior of relevant actors. In this
view, knowledge is produced and disseminated through a network
of actors bound together by the operational rules of the initiative. In
addition, learning processes that enable actors to fulﬁll new roles
and take over new responsibilities may occur. The cognitive function
of private regulatory systems might also lead to discursive changes
within the speciﬁc policy community and beyond.
The second function through which inﬂuence is thought to occur
is integration. Several directions of inﬂuence should be observable:
ﬁrst, international norms that are already embodied in international
treaties may be partially integrated into the private initiative and thus
inﬂuence actors that are not directly targeted by the international
norm. This is also true for standards that emanate from public–private
sources such as regulations by the ISO. Second, private regulatory
systems may serve as a model for other issue areas or even be repli-
cated within the same issue area. In addition, a particular model of
private business regulation may serve as the organizational model
for regulation that is not exclusively private but incorporates public
actors. And third, the direction of inﬂuence may well be focused
on public actors or political systems through the endorsement of
FIGURE 2 The increase in CERES’ endorsing companies and 
coalition members, 1989–2005.
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voluntary business regulation, as a whole or in parts. From this
perspective, behavioral changes that occur as a result of the inte-
grative function of business regulation may include public policies
at national and international levels, as well as instances of endorse-
ment or emulation of private initiatives by other actors of the political
system such as states or international organizations.
I now illustrate the ﬁrst function with reference to the CERES. In
addition to its direct inﬂuences through standards (CERES Principles),
CERES affects actors in the corporate environmental reporting and
management domain through shaping discourses and initiating
social learning processes. In more detail, I discuss the following four
aspects of this cognitive governance: (1) producing and disseminat-
ing information, (2) providing the institutional setting for learning
processes, (3) allowing for problem solving by providing a forum for
discourse and debates, and ﬁnally (4) the diffusion of the regulatory
model. This cognitive function is a result of CERES’ distinct network
structure and the speciﬁc roles and responsibilities of actors therein.
 
Producing and Disseminating Information
 
CERES uses its wide network of coalition members to produce and
disseminate information on issues of key importance. One example
of producing information is the recent attempt made by CERES to
(re)deﬁne the industry’s stance toward climate change. Within this
project, CERES has produced and commissioned a range of studies
that raise the issue of climate change as a risk for business and
investors. For example, in a 2002 report (Innovest Strategic Value
Advisors: 2) CERES states:
“[t]he bottom line [ . . . ] is straightforward: climate change
represents a potential multi-billion dollar risk to a wide variety
of U.S. businesses and industries. It should, therefore, command
the same level of attention and urgency as any other business
risk of this magnitude.”
CERES’ attempt to alter the existing discourse on climate change
within the business community is also reﬂected in recent develop-
ments in its communications strategy. The media strategy that has
been developed from 2001 onward reﬂects the situation that CERES
is often perceived as an environmental advocate, while its audience
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is really the companies and the ﬁnancial markets. As one staff
member recalls, “the shift that CERES tries to make is really about
getting our issues into the ﬁnancial press; not on the environmental
page, but in the business section.”
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 This attempt has been remark-
ably successful with more than ten articles on the issue of climate
change and business risk in major U.S. and international newspapers,
including 
 
The Wall Street Journal
 
, 
 
Financial Times
 
, and 
 
The New
York Times
 
 in 2003 (e.g. Ball 2003a, 2003b; Burr 2003; Feder 2003b,
2003a; Murray 2003). Although the articles do not necessarily men-
tion CERES, they make a strong case for the issue of climate change.
The 
 
Wall Street Journal
 
 for example comments (Ball 2003a), “Here’s
what companies’ directors have to worry about these days: accounting
scandals . . . earnings problems . . . oh, and global warming.” And
the 
 
Financial Times
 
 recalls (Murray 2003),
There was a time when the most prominent voices in the debate
on climate change were environmental lobby groups, activists
and nongovernmental organizations. These days, however,
new speakers are entering the fray: banks, insurers, investors,
and other organizations in the ﬁnancial services sector.
These examples show that CERES acted as a knowledge producer
and knowledge broker through its communications strategy. In the
words of a CERES staff member, “CERES has really driven this
issue and made it into the press.”
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 This view is remarkable because
according to the same interviewee, two years ago [in 2001] there
would not have been an article on climate change and risk in the
business press. The triggering events have been shareholder reso-
lutions on climate change and the corresponding risk for investors.
CERES has also been active in inﬂuencing a new class of actors,
public pension funds, utilizing its existing coalition network. The
2003 Annual CERES Report (2004: 9) states,
Much of CERES’ work in 2003 culminated in the historic
Institutional Investors Summit on Climate Change held at the
United Nations headquarters in New York City on November
21, 2003. There, Ceres, the State of Connecticut Treasurer’s
Ofﬁce, and the United Nations Foundation brought together
institutional investors representing more than $1 trillion in
invested capital together to examine the ﬁnancial risk of global
climate change.
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In particular, the changed voting behavior of large pension funds,
which have started to vote in favor of resolutions calling for adequate
policies concerning climate change, has attracted much media
coverage over the past few years.
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 In the view of one observer, CERES
has been a prime mover and organizer of these critical resolutions,
particularly in highlighting the business case and approaching
mainstream advisors, convincing them that climate change is a
business issue and not just an environmental concern.
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A clear indicator for the success of CERES’ attempt to challenge
the existing discourse on business and climate change can be found
in the 2005 record high voting support for shareholder resolutions
seeking greater analysis and disclosure from companies about
the ﬁnancial impacts of climate change. For example, at the 2005
corporate annual meeting of Exxon Mobil, 28.3 percent of the
shareholders supported
a resolution requesting that the company’s board of directors
[to] undertake a comprehensive review on how it will meet the
greenhouse gas reductions targets in countries participating
in the Kyoto Protocol. The 28.3 percent support represents
1.5 billion shares with a market value of about $83.8 billion.
(CERES 2005b)
Figure 3 shows the number of shareholder resolutions on climate
change ﬁled with U.S. companies from 1994 to 2005.
In sum, CERES’ function as a knowledge and information broker
has clearly been changing the conversation. In its own words (CERES
2004), “An important Ceres communication goal is to ‘change the
conversation’ from the assumption that climate change solutions
will hurt the economy to recognition that inaction is the greater
business risk.”
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Next to brokering knowledge through its media campaign and
communication strategy, CERES also engages in close interaction
with its coalition members, for example, when training them “envi-
ronmental responsibility through dialogue and disclosure” in an
annual corporate accountability workshop.
 
11
 
 In addition to media
campaigns and capacity-building programs, CERES has also estab-
lished, jointly with the Association of Chartered Certiﬁed Accountants
(ACCA), an award scheme for communicating best practices in sus-
tainability reporting in North America (Association of Chartered
Certiﬁed Accountants 2005).
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Learning Networks
 
CERES’ institutional structure as a coalition of diverse actors clearly
facilitates inter-organizational learning processes. Three aspects
warrant closer attention. First, CERES organizes an annual confer-
ence to bring together its coalition members and endorsing companies.
It was just an annual gathering where people within the CERES
network could meet and discuss issues of common concern until
2003, but the conference has recently taken up a more high-proﬁle
role. The new conference format places more emphasis on engaging
endorsing companies and coalition members in strategic projects.
This organizational change is based on the recognition that CERES
does not make adequate use of its wide resources. As one inter-
viewee reports, many people in member organizations lack a clear
understanding of CERES’ work and the possible contribution of
their own organization to this work.
 
12
 
 The conference is an attempt
to increase the involvement of coalition members and endorsing
companies beyond participating in CERES board meetings and com-
mittee work. In addition, greater emphasis is laid on utilizing the dis-
tinct organizational knowledge of participants in workshops and
discussion groups, covering topics from “How investors worldwide
FIGURE 3 U.S. shareholder resolutions on climate change 
1994–2005.
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are addressing sustainability risks and opportunities,” to “Oil:
closing the sustainability gap,” to “Electric power and climate change:
best practices in disclosure and management,” to “The risk to com-
panies of U.S. policy uncertainty on climate change,” to “Chemicals,
consumer products and environmental health: greening supply
chains to boost corporate reputations and the bottom line” (CERES
2005a).
A second example of inter-organizational learning is the investor
summit on climate risk that CERES ﬁrst organized in 2003 and the
resulting Investor Network on Climate Change (INCR) that is led by
CERES. As Amir Dossal and Michelle Fanzo (2004: 334) comment,
[w]hen participants from the U.S. government, the United
Nations, Wall Street and corporate board executives were brought
at the Investors Summit [ . . . ] this allowed participants to explore
the linkages between previously separate ways of thinking.
This is where innovation lies.
One result of combining previously separate ways of thinking is the
10-point “Call for action” that was issued by 10 leading U.S. institu-
tional investors demanding new steps toward climate risk from
business, Wall Street, and the U.S. Security and Exchange Com-
mission. A report commissioned by CERES in 2005 (Gardiner &
Associates), reviewing the progress that has been made since this
ﬁrst call for action, ﬁnds: “A further indicator of investors concern
about climate risk is the degree to which investors are actively
engaged in learning about the issue and how to address it.” Since
2003, members of INCR have organized and sponsored four major
conferences on the issue of climate change and business risk in the
United States and Europe. In sum, both the conferences and the
investors’ network can be considered major examples of inter-
organizational learning involving over 600 different organizations,
from large labor pension funds to the United Nations.
The third example of CERES inducing inter-organizational learning
is the process of mutual endorsement that leads to the formaliza-
tion of relations between companies and CERES. After companies
have communicated their willingness to endorse the CERES Principles,
a detailed negotiation process commences that includes CERES
staff members, CERES board members, and the applicant company.
According to Robert Massie (cited in Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997: 515),
CERES’ executive director from 1996 to 2003,
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this period of negotiation is a mutual learning process in which
CERES board members and ﬁrm executives explore what
CERES might expect from the company and how the ﬁrm’s
performance might change in the future. This process helps a
ﬁrm develop a stronger sense of the environmental issues it
faces and can be one of the most important beneﬁts a ﬁrm
derives from its CERES involvement.
With regard to learning processes within CERES, evidence is less
obvious. CERES has changed during the course of its 16-year his-
tory, from an idea advocated by only a handful of concerned invest-
ment professionals and environmental advocates to a key player in
corporate environmental reporting and management, representing
over 160 different organizations, millions of members, and billions
of invested dollars. However, change within the institution has been
driven by ad hoc decisions rather than long-term strategic planning.
Nevertheless, intra-organizational change can be observed on at least
two occasions. First, CERES has started to put more emphasis on
its unique network of experts, from investment to labor unions and
churches, by changing the format of the annual CERES conference
from one of general meetings and discussions to one of strategic
planning and learning. In addition, CERES has reorganized the
report working groups into stakeholder teams to utilize the strength
of its network. Second, CERES has increased its efforts to inﬂuence
important players on key issues of sustainability such as climate
change while it has downplayed its role as the provider of standard-
ized reporting due to the successful inauguration of the GRI.
 
Deliberative Problem Solving
 
Turning to the third form of cognitive governance, I will brieﬂy focus
on CERES as a forum for problem solving. As one commentator
observes (Anonymous 2000),
Since its founding in 1989, the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES) has played an important role
in the dialogue between businesses and environmental interests.
However, CERES has acted as a facilitator not only of dialogue, but
also of problem solving. The distinct structure of CERES—with its
board meetings, working groups, the annual CERES conference,
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and other major events—provides plenty of opportunity for actors to
meet in person and discuss issues of mutual concern. What seems
important to companies is the fact that these debates take place
behind closed doors, rather than in public. Hence, conﬂicts can be
solved before they get widespread media coverage, an approach
untypical for business–NGO relations.
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 In addition, the close coop-
eration with coalition members has also been credited as an early
warning system for corporations, signaling to them what the next
big issue could be.
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Diffusion of the Regulatory Model
 
Similar to the FSC in forest certiﬁcation, CERES has a considerable
inﬂuence on the policy domain of corporate environmental report-
ing as a whole. In response to CERES, a range of industrial groups
undertook initiatives to deﬁne corporate environmental reporting.
One example is the Public Environmental Reporting Initiative (PERI)
that was jointly developed by 10 major U.S. companies between 1992
and 1994, among them industry leaders such as AMOCO, Dow, and
DuPont, which CERES had initially hoped to win for its own principles.
In addition to passively popularizing environmental reporting,
like in the case of PERI, CERES was also actively involved in main-
streaming, broadening, and essentially globalizing the model of cor-
porate environmental reporting with the successful establishment
of the Global Reporting Initiative. As detailed accounts of the forma-
tive phase of the GRI are given elsewhere (Dingwerth 2005; Waddell
2002), I will only provide a brief summary, focusing on CERES’ dis-
tinct role in the process. The GRI was set up in 1997 to harmonize
and integrate existing environmental/sustainable reporting schemes.
Several companies had approached CERES and raised concerns
about the fragmented scope of reporting and its limited geographical
reach. At the same time, the Tellus Institute, a major North American
think tank in the ﬁeld of sustainability, published its report “Green
Metrics,” a study that compared existing reporting schemes and
their requirements in a single matrix, and identiﬁed overlaps between
various schemes (White and Zinkl 1998). Based on this input,
initial discussions on establishing a broader and harmonized
reporting framework began, leading to the successful establishment
of a steering committee in December 1997. Shortly after, UNEP
could be won as a partner institution, a step that proved decisive,
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both in terms of enhanced legitimacy through public participation,
as well as in terms of scientiﬁc input. Until the GRI became an inde-
pendent organization in 2002, CERES served as its secretariat and
provided most of the ﬁnancial resources. Although being a key driver
of the GRI process, CERES managed to involve a range of other
players in the deliberations that led to the draft GRI principles. In
this context, it was of major importance that CERES had agreed on
transforming the GRI into an independent organization with its own
board of directors early in the process (Waddell 2002: 5–6). In
2005, CERES participated in various GRI working groups and is
represented on its board by Joan Bavaria.
To conclude, the inﬂuence of CERES through its discursive and
cognitive functions can be summarized in four points: ﬁrst, CERES
has considerable inﬂuence through producing and disseminating
information. Its media strategy, with its focus on getting information
about CERES and the risk of climate change into the business press,
has been successful and can be credited with having inﬂuenced the
recent increase in shareholder resolutions on climate change ﬁled
with U.S. corporations. Second, CERES shows clear signs of being an
inter-organizational learning network, mainly through its annual
conference and the establishment of INCR. Third, CERES has
provided a forum for problem solving and early warning, mainly
because it kept conﬂicts within the institution, rather than making
them public before they were solved. And ﬁnally, CERES has forced
other actors in the ﬁeld to react to the general idea of corporate
environmental reporting, and has successfully implemented its
own global sustainable reporting scheme, the GRI.
After this assessment of the cognitive aspects of private business
regulation, I now turn to the function of integration with reference
to the FSC. The concept of integration has a double meaning: ﬁrst,
it refers to the transformation of international or transnational
norms and standards to the level of private business regulation.
The impact is mainly a “legalization” of functional spaces wherein
rules become enforceable (through the process of certiﬁcation and
the threat of withdrawing the respective certiﬁcate) that were not or
only reluctantly enforced beforehand. And second, integration refers
to FSC principles, their underlying rationale, and resulting proce-
dures, being integrated into national political systems or international
agreements. In this case, governments may formally or informally
endorse FSC standards and former state functions may be outsourced
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to the FSC. In addition, public policies, both at the national and inter-
national levels, may be inﬂuenced by the operation of the FSC. Closely
connected to the latter mechanism, formerly marginalized actors may
gain access to policy debates and decisions at national or local levels.
 
Downward Integration
 
Analyzing the ﬁrst mode of integration, the inﬂuence is most visible
in the south, because the existing level of regulation there is rela-
tively low and compliance measures including sanctions are often
only reluctantly enforced in developing countries. The FSC Principles
and Criteria (P&C) demand that “[i]n signatory countries, the provi-
sions of all binding international agreements such as CITES, ILO
Conventions, ITTA, and the Convention on Biological Diversity, shall
be respected” (FSC 2000: principle 1.3). The recent inclusion of the core
ILO conventions
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 into the FSC standards is a major improvement
because government compliance with these treaties has been relatively
weak in many developing countries. As one FSC board member
observes, the FSC is successfully bringing worker rights to the people
on the ground. In this view, the process of certiﬁcation leads to a
stricter enforcement of labor of rights for local workers. As a result, and
often for the ﬁrst time, social interests are considered through the
inﬂuence of the FSC.
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 A recent study commissioned by WWF Europe
(2005: 3) comes to a similar conclusion for temperate forest regions:
Those employed in the forest industry have been some of the
biggest beneﬁciaries of FSC certiﬁcation, through the improve-
ment in the implementation of legislation and guidelines on
health and safety. A reliance on properly qualiﬁed staff, backed
by improved training and a compliance with social taxation
requirements have all led to improved working conditions for
those working in FSC certiﬁed forests.
As a result of these positive developments, unions initially cautious
of the certiﬁcation issue, have “especially over the last two or three
years become more involved in certiﬁcation efforts. They are now
actively participating in a number of national initiatives including
those in Sweden, Germany and Ghana, where they have been involved
in the negotiation of national standards” (Bowling 2000: 134).
A second example for the integration of international or transna-
tional norms into the FSC framework and the resulting impact on
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actors involved in forest certiﬁcation can be found in the FSC
accreditation standards for certiﬁcation organizations that comply
with the regulations of the ISO. Case studies from South Africa, for
example, indicate that certiﬁcation according to FSC standards was
achieved more easily when ISO standards were already in place. In
effect, the integration of existing standards beneﬁts companies
because costly conformance with multiple standards can thus be
avoided.
 
Upward Integration
 
Turning to the integration of FSC standards into national political
systems, three potential mechanisms can be observed. A ﬁrst possi-
bility is that governments endorse the FSC, for example through
their public procurement policies. A recent forest product market
review by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO (Rametsteiner
2002: 163) states that “[p]ublic procurement continued to become a
growing source of demand for CFPs.” In addition to a range of policies
already existing at the municipal level, in most cases due to the
early involvement of city governments in timber boycott activities,
several national governments have announced public procurement
measures that directly or indirectly favor certiﬁed timber. The German
government, for example, decided in 2002 that public procurement
should solely rely on the FSC for wood products. In addition, the
red-green coalition government also clearly stated their commitment
to forest certiﬁcation in general and the FSC in particular in their
2002 coalition contract (World Wide Fund for Nature Deutschland
2002). In a similar vein, the British government has enacted the
“Central Government Timber Procurement Policy.” Another example
is Denmark, which within the context of the ﬁght against illegal log-
ging, decided in 2001 to recognize the FSC label as an appropriate
instrument to ensure the legality of timber imports. Altogether, pro-
curement policies and public endorsement of forest certiﬁcation
exist in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the
Nordic States, Switzerland, the UK, and some states of the United
States. However, as a strong environmental consciousness among
voters is largely conﬁned to OECD countries and governmental action
to accommodate such views is correspondingly limited, endorsement
seems to have little impact beyond industrialized countries.
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A second form of integrating FSC standards into national systems
can be observed in South Africa, where the government has effectively
outsourced its forest surveillance operations to the FSC. Potentially,
this strategy could well spread to other developing countries that
control considerable portions of its forests and seek budgetary relief.
A third form of integration is better documented, namely the
inﬂuence of the FSC on national policies and the corresponding
empowerment of actors in national debates. The multistakeholder
process of the FSC is credited with having had a beneﬁcial inﬂuence
on policy discussions and stakeholder relations, especially in coun-
tries with otherwise weak forestry governance (cf. Bass, Font, and
Danielson 2001). A study in South Africa (Mayers, Evans, and Foy
2001) has revealed that stakeholder consultations on forestry have
contributed to bringing actors to national debates that have so far
been excluded. With regard to the actual inﬂuence of private forest
governance on national forest policies, a recent study argues that
while certiﬁcation has in most cases been a complementary instru-
ment to induce compliance with national laws, “[i]n countries like
Bolivia, there has been a more interactive process between recent
legal forest reforms and certiﬁcation, where incentives to landowners
that engage in certiﬁcation have been speciﬁcally introduced into the
forestry law” (Segura 2004: 9). A second example is Mexico, which
has reacted to the increase of FSC certiﬁcation occurring after 1996
(the FSC headquarter was situated in Oaxaca until 2002) with a
national forestry law closely mirroring the FSC standards on SFM.
Despite considerable impact on national forest politics, the FSC’s
inﬂuence on policy makers has not been driven by a coherent strat-
egy.
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 Rather than proactively inﬂuencing the problem perception of
key players, the FSC more passively provided an example of a cred-
ible solution in sustainable forestry. FSC staff members report that
especially on issues relating to indigenous people, the FSC has had
some success in inﬂuencing policy makers and convincing them
that the FSC is a solution to their problem.
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In addition to the integration of private standards into domestic
environments, private regulatory schemes may also be integrated
into international institutions. Consider for example the recent
World Bank policy toward forest certiﬁcation. It has changed from
rejection to approval as a result of the Bank’s involvement with the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). The resulting WWF–World
Bank alliance was founded in 1998 and has agreed to reach a target
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of 200 million hectares of certiﬁed forests by the end of 2005. As the
WWF has been a key player in the establishment of the FSC and has
demonstrated its support for the FSC as the only credible global
solution to forest certiﬁcation on several occasions, the new Bank
policy can be analyzed as one inﬂuence that the FSC has on the
international political level. The Alliance states that it does not
recognize any one speciﬁc certiﬁcation scheme, but instead has
developed its own set of 9 principles and 11 criteria for certiﬁcation.
However, “[a]t present, the FSC is the only certiﬁcation scheme that
clearly meets the Alliance criteria, although non-FSC certiﬁcation
schemes will be counted toward the Alliance’s target in the
future . . .” (World Bank/WWF Alliance 2003: 3).
To conclude, the integrative function of private business regula-
tion is reﬂected in two major trends. First, binding international
agreements and national legislation, as well as transnational norms,
are transferred to spaces regulated by private regulatory systems.
As a result, norms and rules that have not been implemented
sufﬁciently become enforceable through the private arrangement
operating on the ground. Evidence from tropical and temperate for-
est regions supports the assumption that the FSC has successfully
inﬂuenced, for example, the safety and health conditions of forest
workers. The second integrative trend can be observed in the inﬂuence
that distinct FSC rules and procedures have on national forest
politics. Impacts range from endorsement of the FSC through public
procurement policies to devising national forest laws that mirror
the FSC’s deﬁnition of sustainable forestry. Both mechanisms of
integration clearly show how closely the public policy arena is con-
nected with the ﬁeld of private regulation. On many occasions, the
FSC has utilized international norms complexes, such as sustainable
development and the partnership paradigm, to legitimize its distinct
standards and procedures. On the other hand, public actors have
equally often looked to the private realm for support of their policies
or simply for solutions for their pressing problems. However, it is by
no means evident that the new mode of global business regulation
analyzed in this article can deliver its potential even across the
globe and be equally effective in different national and regional
circumstances. Acknowledging this potential limitation, recent
scholarship has begun to address the scope conditions for effective
and legitimate governance beyond the state in some more detail (cf.
Dingwerth forthcoming; Pattberg 2005a; 2006).
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CONCLUSION
 
The theory and empirical practice of global business regulation has
changed over the last decades. International approaches and instances
of business self-regulation are complemented by new forms of
multistakeholder initiatives often involving nonproﬁt organizations
alongside large TNCs in the establishment and implementation
of global business standards. This transformation in itself is a
remarkable phenomenon. However, when it comes to assessing the
implications of this transformation of global business regulation,
most debate has focused on the actual level of standard uptake and
compliance issues. Hence, many observers are quick to acknow-
ledge that the impacts of global business regulation have only a
marginal status. In this article, however, I contend that the most
remarkable feature of the current transformation of global business
regulation and the growth in the number of coregulative, essentially
multistakeholder approaches, is the additional inﬂuence through
cognitive and integrative processes of governance.
To underscore this argument, the ﬁrst section of this article has
brieﬂy outlined the existing research gap and the resulting ques-
tions, while section two gave a summary of possible classiﬁcations
of the current empirical universe of global business regulation. Par-
ticular emphasis was put on novel arrangements that are private in
nature and combine proﬁt as a well as nonproﬁt interests. Subse-
quently, section three has illustrated the rather modest success of
two empirical examples, the FSC operating in the ﬁeld of forest
certiﬁcation and the CERES that is active in the corporate environ-
mental reporting and management domain. Finally, the fourth
section has presented empirical evidence for two additional types of
inﬂuence that can be attributed to private business regulation:
cognitive and integrative governance.
In sum, while the general perception of many of the existing
approaches in corporate social responsibility is that of “window
dressing” or even “greenwashing,” the qualitative empirical analysis
presented in this article suggests that next to inﬂuence through
rules and standards, private schemes in global business regulation
inﬂuence a range of stakeholders, including business actors, govern-
ments, and civil society organizations through processes of knowledge
brokering, social learning, diffusion of the regulatory model, and
integration of private standards in public regulatory environments.
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These ﬁndings point into an important direction for future research.
While much of the current corporate social responsibility debate
conceptualizes the relation between society and corporations
essentially as a one-way street where demands run from society to
business, the discussion in this article suggests that we witness a
reconﬁguration of the relationship between public, proﬁt, and non-
proﬁt actors. While global business regulation is formally directed
toward economic actors, the institutionalized engagement with civil
society creates dynamics that transcend and transform the ﬁeld of
corporate social responsibility as we know it.
 
NOTES
 
1. A TNC shall be deﬁned broadly as “a ﬁrm which has the power to
coordinate and control operations in more than country, even if it does not
own them” (Dicken 1998: 8).
2. For a detailed discussion of the different organizational logics of
business, nongovernmental organizations, and states, see Waddell (1999).
3. The FSC is not only prominent among environmentalists, but also
among scholars. For recent research on the FSC, see Cashore et al. (2004),
Gulbrandsen (2004), and Pattberg (2005a).
4. For details on the three-chamber system and the resulting rights
and responsibilities of organizational and individual members, see Pattberg
(2005b).
5. Currently, 79.2 percent of the certiﬁed area is in Europe and North
America, while Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America account for only
20.8 percent. For forest management and chain-of-custody certiﬁcates, the
relation is 28.5 percent to 71.5 percent in favor of North America and Europe.
6. Personal interview with CERES staff member, January 2004.
7. Personal interview with CERES staff member, January 2004.
8. One of these new actors is CalPERS (California Public Employees
Retirement Fund), which started to set aside $200 million in a private equity
fund for environmental investing in 2004.
9. Personal interview with CERES staff member, January 2004.
10. CERES has successfully continued this strategy in 2004 and 2005.
See, for example, Murray (2004) and Harvey (2005).
11. Web site document (CERES 2003), on ﬁle with author.
12. Personal interview with CERES staff member, January 2004.
13. Personal interview with CERES staff member, January 2004.
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14. Personal interview with CERES board member, March 2004.
15. The FSC standards demand compliance with all ILO labor conventions
that are related to forestry, in particular numbers 29, 87, 97, 100, 105, 111,
131, 138, 141, 142, 143, 155, 169, 182 as well as the ILO Code of Practice
on Safety and Health in Forestry Work.
16. Personal interview with FSC board member, November 2003.
17. Personal interview with FSC staff member, November 2003.
18. Personal interview with FSC staff member, November 2003.
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